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Allocating greenhouse gas emissions
among countries with mobile populations∗
By
Michael Hoel
Department of Economics, University of Oslo
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Abstract:
In the negotiations towards an agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, one of
the issues negotiated will be the allocation of emissions (or tradable emission permits)
between countries.  In most analyses and policy discussions, it is usually taken for
granted that each country would like their own share of the total permitted emissions
to be as large as possible. The paper demonstrates that if there is population mobility
between a group of countries, this might not be true. If there is a perfectly
homogeneous and mobile population in the countries considered, all these countries
have a common interest in a particular allocation of emission quotas. In the more
realistic case of population heterogeneity, there will typically be an interest conflict
among countries regarding the allocation of emission quotas. However, it need no
longer be true that each country is better off the larger its share of the total number of
emission quotas.
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21 Introduction
In order to prevent dramatic climate changes the next few hundred years, it is
necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from present levels (see e.g. Cline 1991,
1992). To achieve significant reductions in emissions, it will be necessary to have
some kind of international agreement on emission reductions.
In the negotiations towards any agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, there
will be at least two issues on which countries will have conflicting interests. These are
(a) how much should total emissions be reduced
(b) how should the total emission reduction be allocated among countries
These two issues are closely interrelated: For almost all rules of how to allocate
emission reductions, countries will have different opinions about how much the total
reduction should be. The reason for this difference in opinions is partly that different
economies differ in several ways, so that most rules for sharing the emission
reductions (including uniform cuts) will give countries different costs. The benefit
from reducing emissions will also differ between countries, as the adverse effect of a
given climate change will be different for different countries.1
If countries had agreed upon how much the total emission reductions should be, they
would nevertheless usually disagree about how the emission reduction should be
allocated among countries. In most analyses and policy discussions, it is usually taken
for granted that each country would like their own share of the total permitted
emissions to be as large as possible (see e.g. Kverndokk (1993, 1995)). As a main rule,
this is probably correct. However, in this paper I demonstrate that among countries
where there is a large degree of population mobility, each country might not want its
own share of total emissions to be as large as possible.
The climate problem is a global problem involving all countries in the world. There is
certainly far from full population mobility among all countries. The standard
assumption used in most analyses, namely that there is no population mobility, might
be a fair first approximation. However, between certain groups of countries, there is a
considerable degree of population mobility, and there is good reason to expect this to
increase in the future. Examples of areas with a large degree of population mobility
include USA-Canada, and most countries in the European Union. For these areas,
analyses assuming no population mobility are obviously somewhat inaccurate. The
opposite extreme assumption, namely perfect population mobility, is probably even
more unrealistic. It is nevertheless useful to consider this extreme, since the real world
lies somewhere in between the case of no mobility and perfect mobility.
                                             
1 A recent study by Chao and Peck (2000) gives an explicit discussion of the relationship between the magnitude
of the sum of emissions and how these emissions are allocated between countries.
32 Efficient allocations of emissions
We consider a simple model with one good and J countries. Production of this good in
country j is given by a concave fj(nj,ej), where nj is the population in country j. It is
assumed that labor input is an increasing function of the population, so that production
is higher the higher the population is2. The production level is also assumed to be
increasing in the greenhouse gas emission level ej for the interesting sizes of emission
levels. The interpretation is that the function fj(nj,ej) is a reduced form function, telling
us that production is lower the lower are emissions, i.e. that abatement is costly.
Consumption per capita in country j is denoted by cj. Total consumption summed over
all countries cannot exceed total production, i.e.
 ≤ i iiii ii enfcn ),( (1)
Total emissions, denoted by E, are by assumption given, as I in this paper wish to
focus on the allocation of emissions among countries:
 ≤i i Ee (2)
Finally, the total population in the group of countries we are studying is given at the
level N, so that
 =i i Nn (3)
There may be other constraints in addition to (1)-(3). In this paper I discuss what is
meant by efficient allocations of emissions under various additional constraints. Table
1 gives an overview over the different cases considered, denoted A-F.
                                             
2 Throughout he paper, the analysis is simplified by assuming that the relationship between population and labor
input is exogenous.
4Table 1: The six cases A-F studied in sections 3-5
Exogenous
population
Population
determined
through
optimization
Population
mobility
No transfers
between countries A C E
Inter-country
transfers permitted B D F
The cases with given populations in each country (i.e. A and B) have been extensively
studied in the literature, and will be briefly treated in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 treat
the cases with endogenous populations (cases C-F).
3 Exogenous population
Consider first case A, i.e. the case in which population is fixed and we disregard the
possibility of transfers (i.e. side payments) between countries. In this case all
allocations of emissions across countries are Pareto efficient3: An increase in per
capita consumption in one country can in this case only be achieved by increasing the
permitted emissions in this country. But this must mean lower emissions in at least one
other country, giving reduced per capita consumption there.
Case B is somewhat different. Since inter-country transfers in this case are permitted,
an efficient outcome must imply that total consumption is maximized. The condition
for this is that
),(...),( 111 JJJee enfenf == (4)
i.e. that the marginal abatement costs are equalized across countries. This condition is
often referred to as the condition of cost-effectiveness, as it is the condition for
minimizing abatement costs for a given amount of abatement.
In the simple model used here the efficiency condition (4) in combination with the
given sum of emissions and the given population levels gives a unique allocation of
emissions, and therefore also of production levels, across countries. The distribution of
consumption between countries is however not determined by the efficiency condition.
Any distribution of consumption is consistent with (4), given the appropriate transfers
between countries.
                                             
3 More precisely: All allocations giving a positive marginal productivity of emissions (i.e. a positive marginal
abatement cost) in all countries.
5An obvious way to introduce inter-country transfers is via a scheme of tradable
emission quotas. Under such a scheme each country would be allocated a specific
emission quota. However, countries would be free to trade quotas with other countries.
In our simple model, the equilibrium competitive price of quotas will be equal to the
common marginal abatement cost given by (4). Countries selling quotas will receive a
“transfer” equal to the amount of emission quotas they sell multiplied by this price;
and vise versa for countries that buy quotas.
Under such a scheme one gets the efficient allocation of emissions no matter how the
quotas are initially allocated. The initial allocation of quotas is thus simply the device
that picks which of the efficient outcomes we obtain, and is thus a pure distributional
issue.
4 Population determined through optimization
In this section it is assumed that the location of people across countries is a policy
choice, in the same way as we are considering the allocation of emissions as a policy
choice.  This scenario is not meant to be a description of a real world case.
Nevertheless, it is useful as a hypothetical reference scenario.
When population levels are endogenous, one must take some care in the definition of
efficiency. We define efficiency as any outcome that satisfies the constraints of the
problem and maximizes some welfare function W(c1,…cJ) that is increasing in all its
arguments.
Consider first case D, i.e. the case with inter-country transfers. In this case (1)-(3) are
the only constraints of the problem. Maximizing the function W(c1,…cJ) subject to
these constraints gives us (4) and the condition4
),(...),( 1111 JJJnJn enfcenfc −==− (5)
Notice that unless all per capita consumption levels are equal in the efficient outcome
considered, this condition implies that populations (and thus labor input) are not
allocated so that total output is maximized. While this at first thought might seem
counterintuitive, given the existence of inter-country transfers, it is in fact a direct
consequence of the way we define efficiency. To see this, consider the two-country
case. Imagine for a moment that the sum of income in the two countries was given,
independent of where people live. Moreover, consider an outcome where per capita
consumption is higher in country 1 than in country 2. In this case it would clearly be
possible to increase per capita consumption in both countries by moving people from
                                             
4 Throughout the paper, I shall assume that the production functions have properties implying that the population
is positive in all countries in all efficient outcomes. The possibility of zero population in some countries is
discussed by Hoel and Shapiro (2000).
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country 1 to country 25. This would remain true even if this migration gave a slight
reduction in the sum of income. How much the sum of income could go down without
this conclusion being changed depends on the difference between the per capita
consumption levels in the two countries. It is precisely this balancing of per capita
consumption differences with the difference in marginal productivities that is implied
by the efficiency condition (5).
In the two-country case, the efficiency conditions (4) and (5) define a downward
sloping curve in the consumption per capita space, illustrated by Q in Figure 1. All
points along the frontier Q are efficient. Clearly, the residents of country 1 prefer the
points further down and to the right6. Which point one reaches on Q depends on the
size of the transfers. The more transfers country 1 receives from 2, the further to the
right on the line Q will the outcome be. There will be one point along Q that transfers
are zero, we have denoted this point by x.
Consider next case C. In addition to the constraints (1)-(3) we now have the additional
constraints
                                             
5 Notice however that although such a change increases the value of W, it need not be a Pareto improvement:
People moving from country 1 to country 2 may get a reduced consumption level when they move.
6 Strictly speaking, this need only be true for the persons who are residents in country 1 both before and after the
move along the frontier.
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Maximizing W(c1,…cJ) now gives us
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In this “second-best” efficient case, the first-best conditions (4) and (5) are generally
not satisfied. Since the second-best has more constraints than the first-best, the
consumption per capita possibility curve for the former case lies inside Q. The
consumption per capita possibility curve for the second-best case is denoted R in
Figure 1. The curve R lies inside Q, except at the tangency point x. since there in both
cases are no transfers between countries at x.
Case C has an important feature in common with case D: In both cases there is a
conflict of interest between the different countries. In the two-country case, the
residents of country 1 prefer the points further down and to the right on the curve R,
just as they did with the curve Q in case D. There is however an important difference:
While greenhouse gas emissions should always satisfy the cost-effectiveness condition
(4) in case D, this is not true in case C. The reason is of course that since the
possibility of using transfers to distribute consumption is ruled out in case C, the
allocation of emissions now has an important distributional role.
Both of the cases C and D are unrealistic in one important way. They both require that
the distribution of persons among countries is a policy choice. Although countries to
some extent can limit immigration, this is nevertheless a rather strong assumption. In
the next section I therefore consider the opposite extreme, where people choose freely
were they want to live.
5 Population mobility
In this section I consider the case in which there are no restrictions on where people
live. I also make the following strong assumption: People are identical and have no
locational preferences. All they care about is their consumption level7. Given these
strong assumptions, and ignoring corner solutions (see footnote 4), perfect population
mobility will give an equilibrium where per capita consumption is the same in all
countries, i.e.
Jcc == ...1 (8)
This equilibrium condition determines the allocation of populations between countries
in our cases E and F.
                                             
7 Since people are identical, it is assumed that all residents of the same country have the same consumption level.
8For the two-country case, the points along the 45-degree line in Figure 1 give the
equilibrium condition (8). Consider first case E: All points along the 45 degree line
between the origin and the point z, and no other points, are feasible outcomes in this
case. Clearly, both countries have a common interest in achieving the point z. In this
case there is thus no conflict of interest between different countries. They both (or all
in the general case of J countries) would like greenhouse gas emissions to be allocated
in a particular way, namely in a way that maximizes the common per capita
consumption level.
At the point z, there are no transfers between countries. However, generally all
countries can gain from inter-country transfers, thus enabling them to increase their
per capita consumption levels from z to y in Figure 1. This somewhat counterintuitive
result that a donor country may benefit from giving a transfer to another country was
first pointed out by Myers (1990).
Notice that since per capita consumption levels are equalized at the point y, it follows
from (5) that the marginal productivity of labor is also equalized at this point. Together
with (4), this means that total output is maximized at this point.
In case E there are by assumption no transfers between countries. Since international
trade of emissions quotas serves as a type of transfers, case E is a case where such
trade has been ruled out. In this case the final allocation of emissions will be identical
to the initial allocation of emission quotas. Only one particular allocation of quotas
will give the desired outcome z; any other allocation will make all countries worse off.
One interpretation of case F is that country j is given an emission quota ej* and
simultaneously a transfer Yj* (where Yj* can be positive or negative). Obviously, the
sum of transfers over all countries must be equal to zero. Since the allocation of
emissions and transfers in case F implies that the cost-effectiveness condition (4)
holds, marginal abatement costs are equalized across countries. Denote this common
abatement cost by q*. If the quotas of country j are distributed among private agents in
country j, and domestic emission trading is allowed, the equilibrium quota price will
be q*. Since this price is the same in all countries, there will be no incentives for inter-
country emission trading.
An alternative interpretation of case F is that each county j is given an emission quota
equal to ej**≡ ej*+Yj*/ q*, and no transfers. If actual emissions in each country were
equal to the country’s emission quota, marginal abatement costs would not be
equalized across countries. If quotas are distributed among private agents in each
country, there will thus be an incentive for inter-country quota trade. With no
restriction on such trade, the equilibrium quota price will be q*. Country j would in
this equilibrium be selling an amount ej**- ej* of quotas, and thus receiving an income
q* (ej**- ej*)=Yj* from its quota trade. It is therefore clear that this equilibrium is
identical to the case in which country j receives an emission quota ej* and
simultaneously a transfer Yj*.
9From the discussion above it follows that the desired outcome in case F (point y in
Figure 1) can be achieved whatever the initial allocation of emission quotas is,
provided they are accompanied by a suitable set of transfers: Let country j be given an
emission quota ej0 and a transfer Yj0= q* (ej**- ej0). When these quotas are distributed
to private agents, they will in equilibrium be selling an amount q* (ej0- ej*) of quotas,
and thus receiving an income q* (ej0- ej*) = q* (ej**- ej*) -Yj0 = Yj* -Yj0 from their
quota trade. The net transfer to country j is thus Yj*, and its emissions will be ej*, i.e.
the desired outcome is achieved.
Of the cases studied, B and F seem the most interesting cases: It is difficult to find
good reasons to rule out the possibilities of inter-country transfers. Moreover, although
countries can place some restrictions on immigration, population levels in each
country are a long way from being policy variables.
Consider the cases B and F, and assume first that the only inter-country transfers are
the payments related to inter-country trade of tradable emission quotas by private
agents. In this context, cases B and F have very different properties. In B, i.e. the
traditional case without population mobility, there is a conflict of interest between
countries regarding the appropriate initial allocation of emission quotas between
countries. In fact, this allocation is a pure issue of income distribution between
countries, as quota trade between private agents will give a Pareto efficient allocation
of final emissions no matter how quotas are initially distributed among countries. Case
F, i.e. the case with perfect population mobility, is quite different. Here all countries
have a common interest in how emission quotas should be allocated. If they for some
reason are allocated in a different way than this commonly shared optimum, the
governments of the countries would either have to reallocate the emission quotas
before distributing them to private agents, or introduce an appropriate set of transfers
between countries, cf. the discussion above.
6 Locational preferences
The model used in the discussion above is extremely simple in many respects. One of
the simplifying assumptions used is that there are no locational preferences, i.e. people
care only about their consumption levels, and not where they live. This is obviously
unrealistic. Introducing locational preferences is however a simple modification of the
model, as long as these preferences are shared by everyone. To see this let utility of a
person living in country j be given by uj(cj). Notice that this utility level does not
depend on which person we are considering. If e.g. uj(c’)>uk(c’) for an arbitrary
consumption level c’, this means that everyone prefers to live in country j rather than
k. In order for anyone to choose to live in country k instead of j, they would need to be
compensated, i.e. the consumption they could get in k would have to be higher than the
consumption they could obtain in country j. In an equilibrium with population mobility
and people living in all countries we would thus have the equilibrium condition
)(...)( 11 JJ cucu == (8b)
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instead of (8).
In our discussion of Figure 1, the only change would be that instead of the 45-degree
line, we would have an upward sloping line reflecting the locational preferences. If
people preferred country 1 to country 2 (for the same consumption level) this line
would lie somewhere above the 45 degree line. Apart form this change; all of our
results form the previous discussion would remain valid.
Obviously, it is not particularly realistic to assume that everyone has the same
locational preferences. In the next section I therefore consider the case of non-
homogeneous populations, where differences in locational preferences could be one of
the differences between people.
7 Non-homogeneous populations
Assume that there are T distinct types or classes of people. There is homogeneity
within a particular type, and the utility level of an individual of type t living in country
j is as in the previous section assumed to depend on consumption and the country this
person lives in. We denote this utility level by ujt(cjt).
Consider first the case in which the only difference between people are their locational
preferences. In this case the consumption for everyone living in the same country is
the same, i.e. cjt= cj.
If there is no population mobility, differences in locational preferences are of course
irrelevant. The present case is thus identical to the case discussed in Section 3 when
there is no population mobility.
Consider next the case of population mobility, i.e. cases E and F in table 1. Population
mobility will imply that conditions of the type (8b) will hold for all types. However,
we can no longer ignore the possibility of corner solutions, i.e. situations in which
some types live only in a subset of all the countries. Formally, let I(t) be the set of
countries in which persons of type t will live in (in equilibrium). Then instead of
condition (8b) we will have
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t t
j j
t t
j j
u c u for t I t
u c u for t I t
= ∈
≤ ∉
(9)
where ut is the equilibrium value of the utility level of type t.
Unless the differences in utility functions across persons are trivial, the equilibrium
cannot have the property that all types live in all countries. This follows immediately
from (9): If I(t’) is the set of all J countries for a particular type t’, then it follows from
(9) that there is a particular equilibrium consumption pattern across all countries. This
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consumption pattern can only make utility levels for other types be equal across all
countries if the utility functions of other types differ from the function ut’ in a trivial
manner.
There is not much one can say in general about whether or not there will be a conflict
of interest between countries regarding the allocation of emission quotas. There are,
however, two special cases worth mentioning. First, consider the case in which, for all
t, I(t) consists of only one country. In other words, each type of person lives only in
one country. In this case we are, in the neighborhood of the equilibrium, in a situation
where there is no population mobility. The standard results of Section 3 apply to this
case (at least as long as only small reallocations of emission quotas are considered).
A second special case is the one where I(t’) is the set of all J countries for a particular
type t’, i.e. the equilibrium is characterized by people of type t’ living  in all countries.
In this case it follows from (9) that any change in the allocation of emission quotas
will change the per capita consumption levels of all countries in the same direction.
Although most types of persons will be living in separate countries, all types therefore
share a common interest in choosing the allocation of emission quotas that makes all
consumption levels as high as possible.
Let us finally consider the case in which there may also be other differences among
persons than differences in locational preferences. These differences could consist of
differences in labor productivity and in ownership of other resources (e.g. capital and
land).8 To give a general discussion of these types of heterogeneity, let us introduce
the following formal notation: Let  e=(e1,…eJ) denote the vector of emissions from all
countries (satisfying (2), i.e. Σiei≤E). Let sj be a vector describing the policy of country
j, including this country’s choice of all transfers within the country and (under F) to
residents in other countries. The vector s=(s1,…sJ) thus gives a complete description
of the policy choices in all countries.9
Once (e,s) is given, all other variables follow. In particular, the utility levels of all
types and the number of each type living in each country follows.10 Formally,
),( sett uu = (10)
and
),( setj
t
j nn = (11)
                                             
8 See Hoel and Shapiro (2000) for a more detailed discussion of how such differences can be explicitly modeled.
9 As previously, the vector e denotes actual emissions. If emission quotas are tradable, we thus interpret e as the
final allocation of actual emissions. The vector s in this case includes payments for traded quotas. The choice of
the initial allocation of emission quotas is thus reflected in s.(See also the discussion in the second half of
Section 5.)
10 When types differ also in other respects than in locational preferences, consumption levels may differ across
types as well as across countries. It is easily verified that an implication of this is that the equilibrium may be
characterized by several or all types living in all countries.
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Among all emission and policy vectors (e,s), the ones giving Pareto efficiency are of
special interest. All types share a common interest in eliminating all vectors (e,s) that
do not give Pareto efficiency, since everyone can be made better off with appropriate
policy changes if the initial vector (e,s) does not give Pareto efficiency. In an economy
resembling the one presented in Section 1 (except for heterogeneity in populations) all
types would thus share the common interest in having the emission vector being cost-
effective (cf. (4)), provided there are no restrictions on inter-country transfers.
We have already discussed the special case in which locational preferences are the
only differences among types, and where there is one type that lives in all countries in
equilibrium. For this case there is only one Pareto efficient outcome. Clearly, there is
no conflict of interest in this case.
For the more general case there will be several vectors (e,s) giving Pareto efficiency,
and there will thus be pure conflict of interest: Any change in the vector (e,s) that
increases the utility level for one group, will by definition reduce the utility level for
another group.
In order to discuss whether or not there is a conflict of interest between countries as
well as between types we must define what we mean by the welfare level of a country.
Let us therefore introduce a welfare function in each country that weighs the interests
of the different types. These weights may depend on the number of persons of each
type that choose to live in the country. The welfare function for country j must
therefore generally depend on the number of persons of each type living in the country
as well as on the utility levels persons of each type have. Using (10) and (11) we thus
have
1 1( ( , ), , ( , ), ( , ), , ( , )) ( , )T Tj j j j jV u u n n V= Φ = e s e s e s e s e s  (12)
Notice that a special case of this function is where the population and utility levels of
each type t enter only as the product njt ujt.
The discussion above on common interests and interest conflicts among types is not
affected by the properties of the welfare functions that countries have. No matter what
properties these functions have, there will in most cases be a conflict of interests
between different types regarding how emission quotas ought to be allocated. Whether
or not there also is a conflict of interest between countries depends on the welfare
functions of the countries. To see this, consider the special case analyzed by Hoel and
Shapiro (2000). Here we analyze the case in which each country has the same social
welfare function. Moreover, this social welfare function is assumed to depend only on
the utility level of each type, and not on how many people of each type that are living
in the country. In other words, in this case the welfare function (12) simplifies to
1( ( , ), , ( , )) ( , )TjV u u V= Φ =e s e s e s  (13)
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In this special case all countries have the same welfare level, no matter what the vector
(e,s) is. They thus have a common interest in maximizing this common level. In other
words, we get the same situation as we had with homogeneous populations: There is
no conflict in interest regarding the allocation of emission quotas across countries.
This is true independently of whether or not inter-country transfers are permitted, i.e. it
is true both for case E and F.
For the more general welfare function (12), however, there will generally be an
interest conflict among countries as well as among types. This follows directly from
the fact that there is an interest conflict between types. If different countries weigh
different types differently in their welfare functions, this interest conflict carries over
to an interest conflict between countries. However, it is not necessarily true that each
country would like to have as much as possible of the total emission quotas. Any
change in the allocations of emission quotas will typically improve the utility levels of
some types, and reduce it for other types. The effect on the welfare levels of countries
will depend on the specification of the general welfare function given by (12).
8 Concluding comments
This paper has challenged a common view in the literature discussing international
climate agreements. The common view suggests that there is an interest conflict
between countries, in the sense that for a given amount of total emissions, each
country is better off the larger its share of the total number of emission quotas. This
interest conflict is independent of whether or not the emission quotas are tradable.
In the paper I show that if there is a perfectly homogeneous and mobile population in
the countries considered, the interest conflict vanishes. In this simple case all countries
have a common interest in a particular allocation of emission quotas.
The result is modified if one more realistically allows for population heterogeneity. In
this case I show that there typically will be an interest conflict among countries
regarding the allocation of emission quotas. However, it need no longer be true that
each country is better off the larger its share of the total number of emission quotas.
14
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